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INTERNATIONAL LAW-CIVIL RIGHTS-The United States Supreme
Court held that Title VII does not apply extraterritorially to regu-
late employment practices of United States employers who employ
United States citizens abroad.
EEOC v Arabian Am. Oil Co., US , 111 S Ct 1227 (1991).
On March 26, 1991, the Supreme Court of the United States
handed down a decision which prevents United States citizens em-
ployed by United States employers from invoking the protections
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 if such employee was
discriminated against while outside the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States.'
The petitioner, Ali Salim Boureslan, (hereinafter "Boureslan") is
a Moslem and naturalized United States citizen who was born in
Lebanon. The respondents are two Delaware corporations, Arabian
American Oil Company (hereinafter "ARAMCO") and its subsidi-
ary ARAMCO Service Company (hereinafter "ASC").2 ARAMCO
has its principal place of business in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.' ASC
has its principal place of business in Houston, Texas.4
In July of 1979, Boureslan was hired as an engineer by ASC. 5
After working in Houston as a cost engineer for approximately six-
teen months, Boureslan was transferred to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia
at his own request.6 In June of 1984, Boureslan was dismissed from
ARAMCO.7
Following his dismissal, Boureslan filed a charge of discrimina-
tion with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (here-
inafter "the EEOC").8 Boureslan also instituted a suit in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas
1. EEOC v Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S Ct 1227, 1229 (1991) (hereinafter
"ARAMCO").





7. Boureslan v ARAMCO, Arabian Am. Oil Co. and ARAMCO Serv. Co., 857 F2d
1014 (5th Cir 1988). Shortly after beginning work in Saudi Arabia, Boureslan began having
altercations with his supervisor. According to Boureslan, the altercations were the result of a
"campaign of harassment" which the supervisor initiated-a campaign which took the form
of racial, religious, and ethnic slurs and which culminated in Boureslan's termination on
June 16, 1984. Id.
8. ARAMCO, 111 S Ct at 1230.
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against ARAMCO and ASC.9 Boureslan sought relief under both
state law and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196410 on grounds
that he was harassed and ultimately discharged by the respondents
on account of his race, religion, and national origin."
The respondents filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming
that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over
Boureslan's claims because Title VII's protections do not extend to
United States citizens employed abroad by American employers.
2
The district court granted the respondents' motion for summary
judgment and dismissed Boureslan's Title VII claim.' 3 The district
court also dismissed Boureslan's state claim for lack of pendent
jurisdiction. 14 The district court then entered final judgment in
favor of respondents. 5
A panel for the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.' 6 After
vacating the panel's decision and rehearing the case en banc, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's dismis-
sal of Boureslan's complaint.'
7
The EEOC, having primary responsibility for enforcing Title
VII, joined with Boureslan in petitioning the Supreme Court for a
writ of certiorari after the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed 8
the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
9. Boureslan v ARAMCO, Arabian Am. Oil Co. and ARAMCO Serv. Co., 653 F
Supp 629 (1987). Plaintiff was first employed as an engineer for ASC in Texas beginning
July of 1979. In November of 1980, plaintiff was transferred to work for ARAMCO in Saudi
Arabia. Plaintiff's troubles began in September of 1982, when plaintiff's supervisor allegedly
began harassing plaintiff about his national origin, race and religion. Plaintiff's status dete-
riorated, eventually resulting in termination on June 16, 1984. Plaintiff invoked federal ju-
risdiction under 42 USC § 2000(e), but alleged causes of action based on state law in addi-
tion to his Title VII claim. Id.
10. 42 USC § 2000 et seq.
11. See note 7.
12. Boureslan, 653 F Supp 629 (1987). ARAMCO and ASC answered the complaint,
denied its allegations on the merits, and moved to dismiss it under FRCP 12(b)(1) for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. The respondents argued that Title VII has no extraterritorial
application to employment practices by American employers outside the United States. Id.
13. ARAMCO, 111 S Ct at 1230.
14. Id. Whether a federal court will hear and determine a state law claim if it dis-
misses the federal claim, and thus be without an independent jurisdictional basis for pro-
ceeding with the adjudication of the suit, is discretionary with the district court. United
Mine Workers of Am. v Gibbs, 383 US 715, 726 (1966).
15. ARAMCO, 111 S Ct at 1230.
16. Boureslan, 857 F2d at 1015. The court concluded that the rules of statutory con-
struction do not permit the court to say that Congress, through the legislative language or
history, clearly expressed its intent that Title VII be applied extraterritorially. Id.
17. Boureslan v ARAMCO, Arabian Am. Co. and Aramco Serv. Co., 892 F2d 1271
(5th Cir 1990).
18. Boureslan, 892 F2d 1271 (1990). The second agency is the Department of Justice.
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ARAMCO.19 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
to determine whether Title VII applies extraterritorially to regu-
late the employment practices of United States employers who em-
ploy United States citizens abroad. 20 Both parties conceded that
the Congress of the United States has the authority to enforce its
laws extraterritorially.21 The Court determined that the issue in
this case, whether a sufficient showing of congressional intent to
apply Title VII extraterritorially was shown, was one of statutory
construction.22
The Court addressed the issue by stating that a presumption ex-
ists against extraterritorial application of United States laws.23 In
support of this position the Court cited Foley Bros. v Filardo.24
The purpose of this presumption is to protect the interests of the
United States against unintended clashes between United States
laws and the laws of foreign countries which may result in interna-
tional discord. 2 The Supreme Court thereby required that the pe-
19. Boureslan, 653 F Supp 629 (1987).
20. ARAMCO, 111 S Ct at 1230.
21. Id; Foley Bros., Inc. v Filardo, 336 US 281 (1949). See note 23.
22. ARAMCO, 111 S Ct at 1230.
23. Id. Foley Bros., 336 US at 285. In order to determine the issue of whether the
Eight Hour Law, 40 USC § 324 (1912) (repealed by the Act of Aug. 13, 1962, § 203, Pub L
No 87-851, 76 Stat 360), which provides that every contract to which the United States is a"
party shall contain a provision that no laborer or mechanic doing any part of the work
contemplated by the contract shall be required or permitted to work more than eight hours
in any one day unless he is compensated at the rate of one and one-half times the basic rate
of pay for all work in excess of eight hours per day, applies to a contract between the United
States and a private contractor for construction work in a foreign country. The Supreme
Court held that the legislation of Congress, absent a contrary intent, is meant to apply only
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Id.
24. 336 US 281 (1949). See note 23. The rule of construction to be used in determin-
ing extraterritorial application of a law is whether the language in the relevant act gives any
indication of a congressional intent to extend its coverage beyond places over which the
United States has sovereignty or has some measure of legislative control. Foley Bros, 336 US
at 285. The standard by which we must measure Boureslan's arguments is: "An intention so
to regulate labor conditions which are the primary concern of a foreign country should not
be attributed to Congress in the absence of a clearly expressed purpose." Id at 281, 286.
25. ARAMCO, 111 S Ct at 1230. See McCulloch v Sociedad Nacional de Marineros
de Honduras, 372 US 10 (1963). The issue before the Court in McCulloch was whether
Congress intended the National Labor Relations Act, 29 USC §§ 151-68 (1958) (cited sec-
tions amended in 1959, 1970, 1974, 1975, 1978, 1980, 1982, and 1984), to apply overseas.
McCulloch, 372 US at 19. In order to protect against unintended clashes between the laws
of the United States and those of other nations which could result in international discord,
the Court held that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to
apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Id at 21. See also Benz v
Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S. A., 353 US 138 (1957). At issue in Benz was whether the
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 applies to a controversy involving damages result-
ing from the picketing of a foreign ship operated entirely by foreign seamen under foreign
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titioners, as the parties seeking extraterritorial application of the
laws, carry the burden of proof in overcoming this presumption
against extraterritorial application of the law.26
The petitioner contended that the language of Title VII evinces
the clear intent of Congress to apply Title VII extraterritorially.
27
The petitioner based their contentions on the broad definition of
the jurisdictional terms "employer ' 28 and "commerce" 29 in Title
VII and on the statute's "alien exemption"'30 provision.3 1 The peti-
tioner further asserted that since Title VII defines "States" to in-
clude states, the District of Columbia, and specified territories, the
clause must refer to areas beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States.2
The respondents made several alternative explanations for the
expansive language of the statute, arguing that the phrase in the
articles while the vessel is temporarily in an American port. The Court held that where the
possibility of international discord is evident, the Court cannot read extraterritorial applica-
tion into a statute. Benz, 353 US at 147. There must be present the affirmative intent of
Congress clearly expressed. Id at 146. Because foreign applicability was not specified, the
Court could not read into the Labor Management Relations Act an intent to change the
contractual provisions between the United States and the foreign nations. Id at 142. To do
so would interfere with the delicate field of international relations. Id at 146. Only Congress
has the facilities necessary to make important policy decisions where the possibilities of
international discord are so evident and retaliatory action so certain. Id.
26. ARAMCO, 111 S Ct at 1230.
27. Id.
28. An "employer" is subject to Title VII if it has employed fifteen or more employ-
ees for a specified period and is "engaged in an industry affecting commerce." 42 USC §
2000e(b).
An industry affecting commerce is any activity, business or industry in commerce or in
which a labor dispute would hinder or obstruct commerce or the free flow of commerce and
includes any activity or industry "affecting commerce" within the meaning of the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, LMRDA, 29 USC § 401 et seq.
ARAMCO, 111 S Ct at 1231, quoting 42 USC § 2000e(h).
29. "Commerce" is defined as
trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication among the
several States; or between a State and any place outside thereof; or within the Dis-
trict of Columbia, or a possession of the United States; or between points in the same
State but through a point outside thereof.
42 USC § 2000(e)(g).
30. The "alien exemption" provision states:
This subchapter [42 USC § 2000e et seq] shall not apply to an employer with respect
to the employment of aliens outside any State, or to a religious corporation, associa-
tion, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals
of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such cor-
poration, association, educational institution, or society of its activities.
42 USC § 2000e-1.
31. ARAMCO, 111 S Ct at 1233.
32. Id at 1231.
456
Recent Decisions
definition of commerce, "or between a State and any place outside
thereof"3 3 provides the jurisdictional nexus for "commerce" 34 that
is not wholly within a single state. 5 The petitioners further as-
serted that since no mention of commerce with foreign nations was
made, Congress cannot be said to have intended the statute to be
applied extraterritorially.3 6 The respondents supported their argu-
ment by pointing to Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
specifically defines commerce as it applies to foreign nations.37 The
respondents continued by saying that the terms "foreign com-
merce" and "foreign nations" were in the draft of the bill passed
by the House of Representatives, but these words were deleted by
the Senate prior to passing the Civil Rights Act of 1964, thereby
showing that Congress had considered the issue but decided
against extraterritorial application of Title VII3 s
The Supreme Court determined that it was not required to de-
cide between the competing interpretations offered by the parties
as it would have been in the absence of the presumption against
extraterritorial application. 9 The majority addressed the issue by
stating that the language relied upon by the petitioners was ambig-
uous boilerplate which can be found in any number of congres-
sional acts, none of which was ever held to apply overseas.40
The Court explained that the petitioner's reliance on Title VII's
jurisdictional provisions had no support in United States case
law.41 The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that even statutes42
33. 42 USC § 2000e-1.
34. For the statutory definition of "commerce," see note 29.
35. ARAMCO, 111 S Ct at 1231.
36. Id.
37. Id. Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 defines "commerce" as meaning:
travel, trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication among the several
States, or between the District of Columbia and any State, or between any foreign
country or any territory or possession and any State or the District of Columbia, or
between points in the same State but through any other State or the District of Co-
lumbia or a foreign country.
42 USC § 2000a(c).
38. ARAMCO, 111 S Ct at 1231.
39. Id.
40. Id at 1232. The Court cited the following acts as containing "ambiguous boiler-
plate" language: Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 USC § 2052(a)(12) (1988); Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 USC § 321(b) (1988); Transportation Safety Act of 1974, 49
USC App § 1802(1) (1988); Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 USC § 401
et seq (1988); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 USC § 12101 et seq (1990).
41. ARAMCO, 111 S Ct at 1232.
42. Id. See, for example, New York Central R. Co. v Chisholm, 268 US 29 (1925).
There the Supreme Court held that it had no jurisdiction under the Federal Employers
Liability Act, (hereinafter "FELA"), 45 USC § 51 et seq (1988) for a damages action
1992
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which contain broad definitions of "commerce," and which ex-
pressly refer to "foreign commerce," do not apply abroad.
43
The majority found the EEOC's analogy of Steele v Bulova
Watch Co.44 unpersuasive. 45 The Court in Steele found that, by its
terms, the Lanham Act46 applies to "all commerce which may law-
fully be regulated by Congress. ' 47 Because it was expressly stated
that the Act applied to the extent of Congress's constitutional
power over commerce, 48 the Court in Steele concluded that Con-
gress intended that the Lanham Act was to be applied extraterrito-
rially.49 Unlike the Court's interpretation of "commerce" in Steele,
however, Title VII's definition of "commerce" was derived from
the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.50
The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's argument based
on the jurisdictional language of Title VII failed based upon statu-
tory language and previous case law.51 The Court stated that if
plausible interpretations of language such as that relied upon by
the petitioner were allowed, there would be little left of the pre-
brought by a United States citizen employed on a United States railroad who suffered fatal
injuries at a point thirty miles north of the United States border into Canada, because
FELA "contains no words which definitely disclose an intention to give it extraterritorial
effect." Chisholm, 268 US at 31.
43. ARAMCO, 111 S Ct at 1232. Even though the National Labor Relations Act, 29
USC §§ 151-68 (1935) (amended 1947) (hereinafter "the NLRA") contained broad language
which referred by its terms to foreign commerce, 29 USC § 152(6), no congressional intent
was found applying the NLRA overseas because there was not "any specific language" in the
Act reflecting congressional intent to do so. McCulloch, 372 US at 17.
44. 344 US 280 (1952). The Supreme Court in Steele held that the Lanham Act, 15
USC § 1127 (1946), which was designed to prevent the deceptive and misleading use of
trademarks, applied to acts of a United States citizen consummated in Mexico. Steele, 344
US 280 (1952).
45. ARAMCO, 111 S Ct at 1232.
46. 15 USC § 1127 (1946).
47. Steele, 344 US at 288. The Lanham Act's expressed intent is
to regulate commerce within the control of Congress by making actionable the decep-
tive and misleading use of marks in such commerce; to protect registered marks used
in such commerce from interference by State, or territorial legislation; to protect per-
sons engaged in such commerce against unfair competition; to prevent fraud and de-
ception in such commerce by the use of reproductions, copies, counterfeits, or colora-
ble imitations of registered marks; and to provide rights and remedies stipulated by
treaties and conventions respecting trade-marks, trade names, and unfair competition
entered into between the United States and foreign nations.
Id.
48. The Constitution gives Congress the power "to regulate Commerce with foreign
nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian Tribes." US Const, Art I, § 8, cl
3.
49. Steele, 344 US at 280.
50. ARAMCO, 111 S Ct at 1232, citing 29 USC § 401 et seq.
51. ARAMCO, 111 S Ct at 1233.
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sumption against extraterritorial application of congressional
acts.2
The petitioner's second argument was based on a negative infer-
ence to Title VII's "alien exemption provision. '53 The petitioner
argued that because this provision explicitly states that Title VII
does not apply to an employer with respect to aliens outside any
state, the negative inference should be drawn that Congress in-
tended Title VII to cover United States citizens working abroad
for United States employers. 54 The petitioner stressed that there
would be no plausible explanation for inclusion of the provision
unless Congress had intended Title VII to apply
extraterritorially
55
The respondents countered this second argument by stating
that, because aliens are included in Title VII's definition of an em-
ployee and the definition of commerce includes possessions as well
as "States," the purpose of the provision is to declare that employ-
ers of aliens within the possessions of the United States are not
covered by the statute.5 They asserted therefore that the "outside
any State ' 57 language contained in the alien exemption provision
literally means outside any state, but within the control of the
United States .5  The respondents argued that this interpretation
was consistent with the historical development of the alien exemp-
tion provision because Congress included the provision as a direct
response to the Court's interpretation of the term "possessions" in
the Fair Labor Standards Act5 9 in Vermilya-Brown Co. v Con-
nell.s0 The respondents concluded that the alien exemption provi-
52. Id.
53. Id. See note 30 for the text of the alien exemption provision.
54. ARAMCO, 111 S Ct at 1233.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See note 30.
58. ARAMCO, 111 S Ct at 1233.
59. 29 USC § 201 et seq (1938).
60. 335 US 377 (1948). ARAMCO, 111 S Ct at 1233. In order to determine whether
the term "possessions," as used in the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52 Stat 1060,
should be interpreted to include leased bases in foreign nations that were within the control
of the United States, the Court in Vermilya-Brown held that the Fair Labor Standards Act
applied to bases leased by the United States in foreign territory. Vermilya-Brown, 335 US
at 379. Since the statute does not include or exclude whether Congress intended leased ba-
ses to fall within the meaning of the word "possessions," the Court must construe the term
as their judgment instructs, and as they believe Congress would have done had they had the
present situation in mind at the time of the legislation's enactment. Id at 388. The defini-
tion of the reach of the Fair Labor Standards Act covers areas over which the power of
Congress extends. Id at 389. Because the Republic of Bermuda would not undertake legisla-
1992
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sion was included in Title VII to limit the impact of Vermilya-
Brown by excluding from coverage employers of aliens in areas
under United States control 6' that were not encompassed within
Title VII's definition of the term "State."6 Secondly, respondents
asserted that, by negative implication, the exemption protects from
discrimination aliens within the United States.
6 3
The Court rejected the petitioner's arguments, stating that if the
alien exemption clause applies Title VII to employers overseas,
there would be no way of distinguishing its application between
United States employers and foreign employers. 4 The Court
stated that it was unwilling to ascribe to a policy which would raise
difficult issues of international law via the imposition of United
States employment law upon foreign corporations operating in for-
eign commerce.5
While Title VII consistently speaks in terms of "States" and
state proceedings, the Court noted that Title VII failed to mention
foreign nations or foreign proceedings. 6 The Court then stated
that Congress had failed to provide mechanisms for overseas en-
forcement and to address the subject of conflicts with foreign laws
and proceedings as it did, for example, when it amended the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (hereinafter "the ADEA")6
tion similar to the Fair Labor Standards Act to control labor relations on the base, and
because United States citizens would be numerous among employees on the base, the natu-
ral legislative impulse would be to give these employees the protections given those of
United States territorial possessions. Id.
61. ARAMCO, 111 S Ct at 1233-34.
62. The term "State" includes a state of the United States, the District of Columbia,
Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, Wake Island, the Canal Zone, and Outer
Continental Shelf lands defined in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. 42 USC §
2000e(i) (1988).
63. ARAMCO, 111 S Ct at 1234.
64. Id. The Court stated that other elements in the statute suggest a purely domestic
focus such as the indication that the statute not unduly interfere with the sovereignty and
laws of the states, see 42 USC § 2000h-4), that the EEOC is required to accord substantial
weight to findings of state or local authorities in proceedings under state or local law, see 42
USC § 2000e-5, nothing in Title VII shall affect the application of state or local law unless
such law requires or permits practices that would be unlawful under Title VII, see 42 USC §
2000e-7, and provisions addressing deferral to state discrimination proceedings, see 42 USC
§ 2000e-5(c), (d) and (e). Id.
65. ARAMCO, 111 S Ct at 1234.
66. Id.
67. Id. Congress specifically addressed potential conflicts with foreign law by provid-
ing that it is not unlawful for an employer to take any action prohibited by the ADEA
"where such practices involve an employee in a workplace in a foreign country, and compli-
ance with [the ADEA] would cause such employer... to violate the laws of the country in
which such workplace is located." 29 USC § 623(f)(1) (1969) (amended 1984).
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The last issue addressed was an argument by the EEOC that the
Court should defer to its "consistent" construction of Title VII6 s
The EEOC stated that its consistent administrative interpretations
reinforce the conclusion that Congress intended Title VII to apply
extraterritorially s
The Court maintained that the proper amount of deference to be
afforded the EEOC was set forth in General Elec. Co. v Gilbert.
70
In Gilbert, the Court held that the EEOC has no authority to pro-
mulgate rules or regulations but that the level of deference af-
forded "will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consider-
ation, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and
later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to
persuade, if lacking power to control."
71
The Court held that the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII as to
68. ARAMCO, 111 S Ct at 1235. The EEOC cited its Policy Statement No N-915.033,
"[that Title VII] apply to discrimination against American citizens outside the United
States." EEOC Compl Man (BNA) § 605:0055 (Apr 1989). The EEOC further cited a 1975
letter from the EEOC's General Counsel which read in part:
Giving Section [2000e-1] its normal meaning would indicate a Congressional intent
to exclude from the coverage of the statute aliens employed by covered employers
working in the employers' operations outside of the United States.
The reason for such exclusions is obvious; employment conditions in foreign coun-
tries are beyond the control of Congress. The section does not similarly exempt from
the provisions of the Act, U.S. citizens employed abroad by U.S. employers. If Section
2000e-1 is to have any meaning at all, therefore, it is necessary to construe it as ex-
pressing a Congressional intent to extend the coverage of Title VII to include employ-
ment conditions of citizens in overseas operations of domestic corporations at the
same time it excludes aliens of the domestic corporation from the operation of the
statute.
ARAMCO, 111 S Ct at 1245 (Marshall dissenting), quoting letter from W. Carey, EEOC
General Counsel, to Senator Frank Church (Mar 14, 1975).
See also EEOC Dec No 85-16 (Sept'16, 1985), 38 FEP Cases 1889, 1891-1892; EEOC Pol-
icy Statement No 125, at 605:005 to 605:0057.
69. ARAMCO, 111 S Ct at 1235.
70. 429 US 125 (1976), questioned in Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v
EEOC, 462 US 669, 670 (1983), Shaw v Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 US 85, 89 (1983), California
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 479 US 272, 277, 284 (1987). In Gilbert, a class action was brought
by respondents, challenging the disability plan of petitioner as violative of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. Gilbert, 429 US at 127, 128. Under the plan petitioner provides
nonoccupational sickness and accident benefits to all its employees, but disabilities arising
from pregnancy are excluded. Id at 128-29. The district court following trial held that the
exclusion constituted sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. Id at 132. The court of
appeals affirmed, holding that petitioner's disability benefits plan does not violate Title VII
because of its failure to cover pregnancy-related disabilities. Id. The United States Supreme
Court held that Congress, in enacting Title VII, did not confer upon the EEOC authority to
promulgate rules or regulations pursuant to that Title. Id at 141.
71. Gilbert, 429 US at 142, quoting Skidmore v Swift & Co., 323 US 134, 140 (1944).
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extraterritorial application has been neither contemporaneous 72
nor consistent"3 since Title VII came into law. 4 The Court found
the EEOC interpretation to be insufficient to overcome the pre-
sumption against extraterritorial application. 5
The Court summarized by stating that when Congress desires to
do so, it knows how to place the high seas within the jurisdictional
reach of a statute,7 6 and that Congress knows it must make a clear
statement of its intent when a statute is to be applied overseas.
The Supreme Court then stated that should Congress wish to do
so, it may amend Title VII, calibrating its provisions in a way that
the Supreme Court cannot."8
The majority concluded that the petitioner failed to present suf-
ficient affirmative evidence that Congress intended Title VII to ap-
ply extraterritorially, and therefore affirmed the judgment of the
court of appeals. 9
Justice Scalia, concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment, 0 differed with the majority only in the amount of deference
to be given to a decision of the EEOC.s' Justice Scalia differed
72. ARAMCO, 111 S Ct at 1235. The Commission did not reflect in its policy guide-
lines that Title VII applied abroad until twenty-four years after its passage. Id.
73. Id. The Commission's earlier pronouncements on the issue supported the conclu-
sion that the statute was limited to domestic application. "Title VII . . . protects all indi-
viduals, both citizen and noncitizens domiciled or residing in the United States, against
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 29 CFR §
1606.1(c) (1971).
74. ARAMCO, 111 S Ct at 1235.
75. Id.
76. Id. See Argentine Republic v Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 US 428, 440
(1989).
77. ARAMCO, 111 S Ct at 1235-36. See, for example, The Export Administration Act
of 1979, 50 USC App §§ 2401-2420 (1982) (defining "United States person" to include "any
domestic concern (including any permanent domestic establishment of any foreign concern)
and any foreign subsidiary or affiliate (including any permanent foreign establishment) of
any domestic concern which is controlled in fact by such domestic concern. . ."); Coast
Guard Act, 14 USC § 89(a) (1949) (amended 1950) (Coast Guard searches and seizures upon
the high seas); 18 USC § 7 (1952) (criminal code extends to high seas); Smuggling, 19 USC §
1701 (1935) (customs enforcement on the high seas); Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of
1986, 22 USC §§ 5001-5116 (1982) (definition of "national of the United States" as "a natu-
ral person who is a citizen of the United States . . ."); Logan Act, 18 USC § 953 (1948)
(applying act to "any citizen ... wherever he may be. .
78. ARAMCO, 111 S Ct at 1236.
79. Id.
80. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices
White, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter joined. Justice Scalia filed an opinion concurring in
part and concurring in the judgmerlt. Justice Marshall filed a dissenting opinion, in which
Justices Blackmun and Stevens joined. Id at 1229.
81. Id.
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with the majority's finding that the views of the EEOC are not
entitled to the deference normally accorded administrative agen-
cies. 2 The Justice explained that in the most recent case regarding
the amount of deference to be accorded to a decision of the EEOC,
EEOC v Commercial Office Prods. Co.,ss the Supreme Court said,
"the EEOC's interpretation of ambiguous language need only be
reasonable to be entitled to deference. ' s4 Justice Scalia offered a
resolution to this unsettled issue by stating that "deference is not
abdication, and it requires us to accept only those agency interpre-
tations that are reasonable in light of the principles of construction
courts normally employ."85 Justice Scalia concluded that because
of the presumption against extraterritoriality and the requirement
that congressional intent be clearly expressed, it is not reasonable
for the Court to give effect to the implications of the statutory lan-
guage as the EEOC has done. 6
Justice Marshall, writing the dissent and joined by Justices
Blackmun and Stevens, stated that the majority has adopted a
"clear statement rule"8' 7 relieving the majority from its duty to give
effect to all other traditional tools of statutory construction used to
ascertain congressional intent.88 Justice Marshall stated that if the
majority were to apply the traditional tools of statutory construc-
tion, the conclusion is inescapable that Congress intended Title
82. Id, citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
US 837 (1984).
83. 486 US 107 (1988). At issue before the Court in Commercial Office Prods. was
whether a state agency's decision to waive its exclusive sixty day period for initial processing
of a discrimination charge, pursuant to a work-sharing agreement with the EEOC, "termi-
nates" the agency's proceedings within the meaning of § 706(c) of Title VII, 78 Stat 260, as
amended in 1972, 86 Stat 104, 42 USC § 2000e-5(c), so that the EEOC immediately may
deem the charge filed. Commercial Office Prods., 486 US at 109-10. The Court held that the
state agency's decision to waive § 706(c)'s sixty day period terminates the agency's proceed-
ings within the meaning of § 706(c), so that the EEOC may immediately deem the charge
filed and begin to process it. Id at 108. The contention of respondents that the state agency
did not "terminate" its proceedings because it retained jurisdiction to act on the EEOC's
resolution of the charge was rejected in favor of the EEOC's position that a state agency
"terminates" its proceedings when it declares that it will not proceed, if it does so at all, for
a specified interval of time, since the interpretation of ambiguous language in the Act by the
EEOC "need only be reasonable to be entitled to deference." 486 US at 115.
84. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 486 US at 115.
85. ARAMCO, 111 S Ct at 1237.
86. Id.
87. Foley Bros. v Filardo, 336 US 281, 291 (1949). An intention to regulate labor
conditions which are the primary concern of a foreign country should not be attributed to
Congress in the absence of a clearly expressed purpose. See note 91.
88. ARAMCO, 111 S Ct at 1237.
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VII to apply extraterritorially. 89
The dissent contended that the majority has transformed the ca-
non of construction "that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary
intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial juris-
diction of the United States" 90 into a "clear statement rule"91 al-
lowing the majority to derive meaning from congressional silence
on the issue.92
The dissent alleged that the majority had incorrectly distorted
the canon of construction found in Foley Bros.,93 stating that the
range of factors considered by the Court in Foley Bros. demon-
strated that the presumption against extraterritoriality is not a
clear statement rule.94 The Court in Foley Bros. had considered
the entire range of conventional sources of statutory construction
including legislative history, statutory structure, and administra-
tive interpretations.9"
The dissent summarily concluded by stating that the majority
had transformed the presumption against extraterritoriality, an
approach employed to ascertain congressional intent, into a barrier
precluding genuine inquiry into the sources that reveal Congress'
actual intentions.96
The inquiry as to whether Congress has exercised its power to
enact legislation with extraterritorial application must, in cases
like ARAMCO, be determined by statutory interpretation. The
United States Constitution grants Congress the power to make
''needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other
Property belonging to the United States. ' 97 Congress' power to
regulate the actions of United States citizens outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States, whether or not the act punished
occurred within the territory of a foreign nation, was established
initially in United States v Bowman.98 In Bowman it was pointed
89. Id.
90. Foley Bros., 336 US at 285.
91. ARAMCO, 111 S Ct at 1237. "Clear statement rules operate less to reveal actual
congressional intent than to shield important values from an insufficiently strong legislative
intent to displace them." Id at 1238. "When they apply, such rules foreclose inquiry into
extrinsic guides to interpretation, and even compel courts to select less plausible candidates
from within the range of permissible constructions." Id.
92. Id at 1237.
93. Id. See note 23.
94. ARAMCO, 111 S Ct at 1238.
95. Id.
96. Id at 1237.
97. US Const, Art IV, § 3, cl 2.
98. 260 US 94 (1922). Bowman involved a conspiracy to collect damages from the
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out that legislation concerning United States citizens could not of-
fend the dignity or right of sovereignty of another nation.99
Subsequently, the Supreme Court decided Vermilya-Brown Co.
v Connell.100 The issue presented in Vermilya-Brown was the ap-
plicability of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938101 (hereinafter
"the FLSA") to employees allegedly engaged in commerce or the
production of goods for commerce on a leasehold of the United
States." 2
The United States obtained a military base on the island of Ber-
muda through a lease executed by the British Government. 103 Cer-
tain employees of contractors who had work contracts with the
United States on the base brought suit under Section 16(b) of the
FLSA for recovery of unpaid overtime compensation. 4 The Court
held that the FLSA covered the employees even though the leased
area was under the sovereignty of Great Britain and not a territory
of the United States. 0 5
The Court reasoned that since the statute does not state whether
Congress intended leased bases to fall within the meaning of the
word "possessions," the term must be construed as the Court's
judgment instructs and as they believe Congress would have done
had Congress had the present situation in mind when enacting the
legislation. 06 The Supreme Court held that the FLSA covered ar-
eas over which the power of Congress extends by United States
sovereignty or by voluntary grant of the authority by the sover-
United States for the delivery of one thousand gallons of fuel oil. Bowman, 260 US at 96.
Only six hundred gallons were delivered. Id. The issue before the Court was whether it had
jurisdiction since the act occurred while the ship carrying the cargo was on the high seas and
therefore out of the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Id at 96-97. The Court held
that criminal statutes do not depend on their locality for governmental jurisdiction, stating
that to do so would greatly curtail the scope and usefulness and leave a large area open for
fraud. Bowman, 260 US at 98.
99. Id at 102. The Court stated that it would not be offensive to the dignity or right
of sovereignty of a foreign government to hold United States citizens for crimes committed
against the United States.
100. 335 US 377 (1948).
101. See note 60. The Fair Labor Standards Act covers commerce "among the several
States or from any State to any place outside thereof." 29 USC § 203(b) (1938). State means
"any State or the United States of the District of Columbia or any Territory or possession of
the United States." 29 USC § 203(c) (1938).
102. Vermilya-Brown, 335 US at 378.
103. Id.
104. Id at 379.
105. Id at 380.
106. Id at 388.
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eign. 10" Because the Republic of Bermuda would not undertake
legislation similar to the FLSA to control labor relations on the
base, and because United States citizens would be numerous
among employees on the base, the natural legislative impulse
would be to give these employees the same protections that were
given those similarly employed on United States territorial
possessions.108
Three months after the decision in Vermilya-Brown, the Court
decided Foley Bros. v Filardo.0 9 The issue in Foley Bros. was
'$whether the Eight Hour Law'1 0 should be applied to a construc-
tion contract between the United States and a private contractor
for work to be performed in a foreign country." '' The case in-
volved an employment contract executed in Iraq and Iran between
the respondent, an American citizen employed by the petitioner,
an American corporation. 112 The text of the employment contract
stated that the petitioner agreed to "obey and abide by all applica-
ble laws, regulations, ordinances, and other rules of the United
States of America." 113 The respondent frequently worked more
than eight hours a day and was refused compensation for overtime
under this contract." 4 The Court held that the Eight Hour Law
was not applicable to work done under this contract." 5 The Court
reasoned that neither the textual language nor the legislative his-
tory of the Eight Hour Law indicated a congressional purpose to
extend the law's coverage beyond places over which the United
States has sovereignty or some measure of control."6
In 1957 the Court handed down its decision in Benz v Compania
Naviera Hidalgo, S.A."' Benz involved the extraterritorial appli-
cation and interpretation of the Labor Management Relations Act
of 1947.118 A labor dispute developed between the owners of a for-
eign vessel and its seamen, all of whom were foreign. 1 9 These
107. Id at 381.
108. Id.
109. Foley Bros., 336 US 281 (1949).
110. 40 USC § 324. See note 23.
111. Foley Bros., 336 US at 282.
112. Id at 283.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id at 290.
116. Id at 285-86.
117. 353 US 138 (1957).
118. 29 USC § 141.
119. Benz, 353 US at 139.
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seamen went on strike while in an Amerikcan port 120 and, with the
assistance and support of American unions, sought a remedy under
the Labor Management Relations Act.
121
The Court held that because foreign applicability was not speci-
fied, an intent to change the contractual provisions between the
foreign shipowner and the foreign seamen could not be read into
the Labor Management Relations Act.12 2 The Court here stated
that foreign applicability would interfere with the "delicate field of
international relations,' 1 23 and declared that only Congress "has
the facilities necessary to make fairly such an important policy de-
cision where the possibilities of international discord are so evident
and retaliatory action so certain.' 1 24 The Court concluded that, be-
cause of the concern with possible interference in the field of inter-
national relations, the affirmative intent of Congress must be
clearly expressed.1
2 5
Subsequently, the Court decided McCulloch v Sociedad Na-
cional de Marineros de Honduras.26 McCulloch involved a United
States corporation that beneficially owned vessels which regularly
sailed between the United States, Latin America, and other ports,
transporting the corporation's products and other supplies. 127 Each
ship was legally owned by a foreign subsidiary of the American cor-
poration. 28 Members of the crews of those vessels, although al-
ready represented by a foreign union, sought representative elec-
tions from the National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter "the
Board"). 29 The Board held that the National Labor Relations Act
(hereinafter "the NLRA")" ° extended to the crew members of
these vessels and ordered the elections.' 31 That action brought vig-
orous protests from foreign governments and created international
problems for the United States government. 3 2 The Court was
faced with the issue of whether the jurisdictional provisions of the
NLRA extended to the maritime operations of foreign-flagged
120. Id.
121. Id at 140.
122. Id at 146-47.
123. Id at 147.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. 372 US 10 (1963).
127. McCulloch, 372 US at 12.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. 29 USC §§ 151-168 (1988).
131. McCulloch, 372 US at 12.
132. Id at 16-17.
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ships owned by foreign subsidiaries of American corporations em-
ploying alien seamen.'
The Court found that there was no specific language in the
NLRA itself or in the legislative history that reflected a congres-
sional intent to include a foreign-flagged vessel within the NLRA's
coverage.134 The Court stated that, in international law, "the law of
the flag state ordinarily governs the internal affairs of a ship.'
13 5
The Court held that even though the NLRA contained broad lan-
guage that referred by its terms to foreign commerce, there was no
congressional intent to apply the statute abroad because there was
no specific language in the NLRA reflecting a congressional intent
to do so.13 6 As was the case in Benz,. 37 the Court in McCulloch 38
based its decision upon a concern for international comity and held
that the Board was without jurisdiction to order the election.
139
On December 4, 1980, the United States District Court in the
District of New Jersey decided Bryant v International Schools
Servs., Inc.,' 40 holding that Title VII has extraterritorial effect and
is applicable to the employment practices of an American corpora-
tion employing United States citizens in Iran.14 ' In Bryant, two
American citizens were employed by International Schools Ser-
vices, Inc. (hereinafter "ISS"), an American corporation, 42 as
teachers. The employees had instituted suit under Title VII charg-
ing that the practice of ISS of awarding two distinct employment
contracts, which offered substantially different rates of compensa-
tion and benefits, unlawfully discriminated against plaintiffs on the
basis of sex.'
43
133. Id at 17.
134. Id at 19-20.
135. Id at 21, citing Wildenhus's Case, 120 US 1 (1887).
136. McCullough, 372 US at 19.
137. See note 25.
138. Id.
139. McCulloch, 372 US at 22.
140. 502 F Supp 472 (1980).
141. Bryant, 502 F Supp at 482.
142. Id at 472. ISS is a private, non-profit corporation organized under the laws of the
District of Columbia and works by contract with overseas governments or corporations to
operate schools for children of American employees overseas. Id.
143. Id. Regardless of the kind of contract, the duties of the teachers did not differ.
The first type of contract was termed a "local hire" contract. The second type of contract
was termed an "ISS-sponsored" contract. Persons under the ISS-sponsored contract re-
ceived additional allowances such as 25% increase in base salary, transportation costs, relo-
cation allowances, housing allowances, annual round-trip airfare to the United States, and
others. If a person was hired in the United States to work in Iran, that person received the
ISS-sponsored contract. If a person was hired in Iran, that person received a local hire con-
Vol. 30:453
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The Bryant Court, relying on the negative implications of the
alien exemption provision of Title VII, determined that the issue
of whether an Act applies extraterritorially was a matter of statu-
tory construction.' The Court cited a footnote in Love v Pull-
man, 45 which stated that,
Since Congress explicitly excluded aliens employed outside of any state, it
must have intended to provide relief to American citizens employed outside
of any state in an industry affecting commerce by an employer otherwise
covered under the act. .... An additional support for this interpretation
comes from the international or extraterritorial application of the anti-trust
laws.
146
Bryant was reversed on appeal and the Third Circuit expressly de-
clined to reach the question of extraterritorial application of Title
VII, stating that it was unnecessary to do so.
1' 7
Following the decision in Bryant was Seville v Martin Marietta
Corp.4 " In Seville, four female clerical employees challenged de-
fendant Martin Marietta's policy of paying certain fringe bene-
fits 149 to its "technical"' 50 employees but not to its "clerical"' 15 em-
ployees at defendant's facility in Frankfurt, West Germany. The
stated purpose of the policy was "to compensate employees for ex-
traordinary and additional expenses incurred while on non-domes-
tic assignments.' ' 52 All clerical employees were hired from a local
pool of United States citizens.'53
Defendant Martin Marietta challenged the Court's jurisdiction
tract. Id. The plaintiffs in this case were both local hires who had travelled to Iran with
their husbands who were employed by Grumann Aerospace and Bell Helicopter. Id at 474.
144. Id at 482. See 42 USC § 2000e-1.
145. 12 Empl Prac Dec 11,225 (D Colo 1976).
146. Bryant, 502 F Supp at 482-83, quoting Love v Pullman, 12 Empl Prac Dec 11,
225 (D Colo 1976).
147. Bryant v International Schools Servs., Inc., 675 F2d 562 (3d Cir 1982).
148. 638 F Supp 590 (D Md 1986).
149. Seville, 638 F Supp at 591. The benefits provided to technical employees but not
to clerical employees included: (1) foreign service premium of 15% of base wage; (2) per
diem allowance for cost of living overseas; (3) housing expenses; (4) reimbursement of mov-
ing and travel expenses to and from the United States and the foreign facility; (5) annual
and emergency home leave; and (6) educational allowance for employee dependents. Id at.
592.
150. Id. The technical workers provided mechanical and electrical repairs and were
additionally responsible for quality control and site support. Id.
151. Id. The clerical workers were secretaries to the Site Manager and the Contract





of the case, contending that Title VII was not intended to apply
extraterritorially. 5 4 The Court in Seville denied that challenge and
expressly adopted the decisions of Bryant and Love, holding that
the alien exemption provision brings United States citizens em-
ployed by United States corporations outside of the territory of the
United States within the protections of Title VII.155
Finally, on June 7, 1990, the United States District Court for the
Western District of Washington decided the case of Akgun v Boe-
ing Co.156 Defendant Boeing provided support and maintenance
services to the United States government at various military bases
in Turkey. 57 Both plaintiffs were married to Turkish nationals and
resided in Turkey at the time of their initial employment. 5 8 The
plaintiffs were originally treated by Boeing as members of the "ci-
vilian component" of the United States forces stationed in Turkey,
and therefore entitled to various privileges under the North Atlan-
tic Treaty-Status of Forces Agreement, (hereinafter "the NATO-
SOFA").'59 These privileges included payment in United States
currency, exemption from Turkish taxes and duties, and certain
United States Air Force base privileges. 6 0
In 1982 Boeing informed plaintiffs that they would no longer be
considered part of the civilian component because of Boeing's
reading of NATO-SOFA and Turkish law.'' Plaintiffs' new con-
tract placed them on the Turkish lira payroll and Turkish taxes
were withheld.'62 Plaintiffs filed a charge of discrimination with
the EEOC and filed an action in the district court. 6 3 The defend-
ant filed a motion to dismiss, contending that Title VII does not
154. Id at 591.
155. Id at 592. The Court stated, "These decisions are soundly reasoned and this
Court adopts their logic. Accordingly, Martin Marietta's jurisdictional challenge is denied."
Id.
156. 1990 US Dist LEXIS 11845, *1 (W D Wash).
157. Akgun, 1990 US Dist LEXIS at *1.
158. Id at *2.
159. Id. The NATO-SOFA is found at 4 UST 1972, TIAS No 2846.
160. Akgun, US Dist LEXIS at *2.
161. Id. Turkish law requires that the domicile of a married woman is the domicile of
her husband. NATO-SOFA defines the civilian component as "[T]he civilian personnel ac-
companying a Force of a Contracting Party who are in the employ of an armed service of
the Contracting party and who are not stateless persons, not nationals of any State which is
not a party to the North Atlantic Treaty, nor nationals of, nor ordinarily resident in, the
State in which the Force is located." Therefore, because plaintiffs were not ordinarily resi-
dent in Turkey because they were married to Turkish men, they were removed from the
civilian component and rehired under Turkish contracts. Id.
162. Id at *3.
163. Id at *4.
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apply extraterritorially. 6  The motion was denied.
165
It is significant that Akgun was decided after the Fifth Circuit
Court decided Boureslan.' 6 The Court in Akgun expressly held
contrary to the Court in Boureslan.16 7 The Court in Akgun based
its decision on two reasons: (1) the presumption against extraterri-
torial application of statutes does not require an affirmative ex-
pression of congressional intent before an act will be considered as
violating international law; 68 and (2) congressional intent is sup-
plied by the alien exemption provision,169 legislative history,170 and
the amendments to the ADEA.'' The Court distinguished the pre-
sumption against extraterritorial application of a statute from the
presumption that Congress did not intend to violate international
law, 7 2 holding that an affirmative expression of intent is required
only if a statute violates international law.'
73
In locating congressional intent, the Court first looked to the
alien exemption provisions.' 74 The Court agreed with Judge King's
dissent in Boureslan,75 which stated that "if no individual were
intended to be covered extraterritorially by Title VII, a specific
provision excluding only aliens would be superfluous.' 76 The
Court regarded as redundant the argument that the intent of the
exemption was to include aliens within the United States, deter-
mining that aliens were already covered by the definition of "em-
ployee" as an individual.
77
164. Id.
165. Id at *11.
166. Id at *5.
167. Id.
168. Id at *6.
169. 42 USC § 2000e-1. See note 30.
170. See note 188 and accompanying text.
171. See note 67.
172. Akgun, 1990 US Dist LEXIS at *6.
173. Id.
174. 42 USC 2000e-1. See also note 30.
175. Boureslan v ARAMCO, Arabian American Oil Co. and ARAMCO Serv. Co., 892
F2d 1271, 1275 (1990).
176. ARAMCO, 892 F2d at 1275.
177. Id. See 42 USC § 2000e(f).
The term "employee" means an individual employed by an employer, except that the
term "employee" shall not include any person elected to public office in any State or
political subdivision of any State by the qualified voters thereof, or any person chosen
by such officer to be on such officer's personal staff, or an appointee on the policy
making level or an immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of the constitu-
tional or legal powers of the office. The exemption set forth in the preceding sentence
shall not include employees subject to the civil service laws of a state government,
governmental agency or political subdivision.
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The Court also sided with Judge King's dissent in Boureslan
that evidence of congressional intent may be found in the legisla-
tive record, where it was stated that "the intent of the [alien] ex-
emption is to remove conflicts of law which might otherwise exist
between the United States and a foreign nation in the employment
of aliens outside the United States by an American enterprise. "178
The Court thus found that Congress would have no concern over
conflicts of laws unless Title VII was intended to apply
extraterritorially.1
79
Finally, the Court noted that a 1984 amendment to the
ADEA,180 designed to extend ADEA coverage to United States citi-
zens working in foreign countries, was introduced to bring the stat-
ute into conformity with Title VII.1'8 The purpose of the amend-
ment was determined to be to repair the anomaly of having Title
VII apply abroad while the ADEA, an enactment with similar leg-
islative goals, only applied domestically."8 2
The Court's decision in ARAMCO is a most ironic one. On the
very day that ARAMCO was argued before the Supreme Court,
January 16, 1991, United States military forces, including an un-
precedented number of women and minorities based in Saudi Ara-
bia and the Middle East, launched operation "Desert Storm," a
campaign that would eventually free Kuwait from Saddam Hus-
sein and the nation of Iraq." 3 While President George Bush and
his administration had made known its adoption of international
law as the foundation for United States foreign policy, the Su-
preme Court was rejecting international law in favor of an isola-
tionist presumption that United States concerns end at the water's
edge.1
8 4
The district court was unique in dismissing Boureslan's claim as
every other lower federal court that had considered the issue had
held that Title VII does apply to a United States company's dis-
crimination abroad against an employed United States citizen.'85
Id.
178. Akgun, 1990 US Dist LEXIS at *6, citing Boureslan, 892 F 2d at 1276 (King
dissenting), citing Hearing on HR 7152, 88th Cong, 1st Sess, 2303 (1963).
179. Akgun, 1990 US Dist LEXIS at *6.
180. 29 USC § 621 et seq.
181. Akgun, 1990 US Dist LEXIS at *10.
182. Id.
183. Gary Born and W. Hardy Callcott, When Basic Rights Stop at the Border, Legal
Times 26, 27 (May 27, 1991).
184. Born and Callcott, Legal Times at 26 (cited in note 183).
185. See Bryant v International Schools Servs., Inc., 502 F Supp 472 (D NJ 1980),
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By this decision, the Court has now allowed United States employ-
ers to discriminate against United States workers in the most out-
rageous manner, as long as they wait until their victims pass
through customs.18
The evidence that Congress intended Title VII to apply extrater-
ritorially is compelling. By its broad jurisdictional terms, Title VII
covers businesses engaged not just in interstate commerce, but also
in commerce "between a State and any place outside thereof.
18 7
The legislative history of Title VII cites cases upholding Congress'
authority to regulate commerce to the full extent permitted by the
Constitution.
The inference that Congress intended Title VII to apply over-
seas is further drawn from the fact that Title VII specifically ex-
cludes from its protection aliens employed abroad. 188 The legisla-
tive record contains the following statement regarding this
exemption: "The intent of the [alien] exemption [clause] is to re-
move conflicts of law which might otherwise exist between the
United States and a foreign nation in the employment of aliens
outside the United States by an American enterprise. '" 18 9 Also,
while Title VII was being considered, both Congress and President
Kennedy emphasized the important role it would play in domestic
as well as international policies. 190 The last case where the pre-
rev'd on other grounds, 675 F2d 562 (3d Cir 1982); Love v Pullman, 13 FEP 423 (D Colo
1976), afl'd on other grounds, 569 F 2d 1074 (10th Cir 1978); Seville v Martin Marietta
Corp., 638 F Supp 590 (D Md 1986); Akgun v Boeing Co., 53 Empl Prac Dec (W D Wash
1990). In all of these cases the courts concluded that the alien exemption provision reflects
an intention to provide American citizens with protection from employment discrimination
abroad.
186. Born and Callcott, Legal Times at 26 (cited in note 183).
187. 42 USC § 2000(e)(g).
188. In section 4... a limited exception is provided for employers with respect to
employment of aliens outside of any State.. . . The intent of [this] exemption is to
remove conflicts of law which might otherwise exist between the United States and a
foreign nation in the employment of aliens outside the United States by an American
enterprise.
HR Rep No 570, 88th Cong, 1st Sess 4 (1963), reprinted in Civil Rights, Hearings on HR
7152, as amended, before Subcommittee No 5 of the Committee on the Judiciary, 88th
Cong, 1st Sess 2303 (Civil Rights Hearings).
189. Civil rights: Hearing on HR 7152 before the House Committee on the Judiciary,
88th Cong 1st Sess 2393 (1963) (testimony of Representative Roosevelt explaining provi-
sions of HR 405 which was incorporated into Title VII of HR 7152).
190. In calling for passage of the civil rights legislation that became the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, President Kennedy stated: "In this year of the emancipation centennial, justice
requires us to insure the blessings of liberty for all Americans and their posterity - not
merely for reasons of economic efficiency, world diplomacy, and domestic tranquility - but,
above all, because it is right." Special Message to Congress by the President June 19, 1963
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sumption against extraterritoriality was applied was in Foley Bros.
v Filardo.191 In Foley Bros., the extraterritoriality presumption was
applied only because there was no evidence whatsoever of congres-
sional intent. 92 The Court's claimed finding of the clear-statement
requirement in McCulloch did not involve extraterritoriality.
9 3
Rather, McCulloch involved a statute which was shown to protect
only United States workers, not foreign workers. 94
Under international law, the ability of a state to prescribe"9 5 or
make applicable its laws is based upon a two-part test. Section
401(a) of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the
United States provides that in order to determine the legitimacy of
exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction, there must be a jurisdic-
tional basis to prescribe and, secondly, the assertion of jurisdiction
must not be unreasonable. The jurisdictional basis for applying Ti-
tle VII extraterritorially to the instant case may be found in the
internationally accepted principle of nationality jurisdiction to pre-
scribe, which provides that "a state has jurisdiction to prescribe
law with nationals outside as well as within its territory.' ' 9 6 This
basis of jurisdiction applies to juridical persons including corpora-
tions."'97 A corporation's nationality is that of the state under
whose law it is organized. 98
Both ARAMCO and Boureslan are citizens of the United States
and have substantial connections with the United States. Com-
bined with the lack of any countervailing Saudi laws calling for
application of United States laws under choice-of-law principles,
the assertion of jurisdiction by the United States under the nation-
ality principle would not have been unreasonable and the result
should have been apparent.
in 109 Cong Rec 1055, 1063.
Furthermore, the House reports on the 1964 Civil Rights Act urged that the bill was nec-
essary to combat totalitarian regimes abroad, as well as to preserve the global competitive
position of the United States and present an example to newly emerging nations. HR Rep
No 1370, 87th Cong, 2d Sess at 3 (1962).
191. See notes 23, 109 and accompanying text.
192. Foley Bros., 336 US 281, 286 (1949).
193. McCulloch, 372 US at 21.
194. Id at 13. See note 126 and accompanying text.
195. Prescriptive jurisdiction is defined as jurisdiction of a state to "make its laws
applicable to the activities, relations, or status of persons, or the interests of persons in
things whether by legislative action, by executive act or order, by administrative rule or
regulation, or by determination by a court." Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law
§ 401(a) (1987).
196. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 402(2) (1987).
197. Restatment (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 402(2), comment e (1987).
198. Id.
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The millions of United States citizens employed by United
States employers overseas now suddenly realize that they are with-
out the protections of Title VII and other untold federal laws. In
fact, the rigidity of this rule of territoriality may not provide a
remedy for discrimination on even brief business trips.
Finally, the majority in ARAMCO noted with interest the 1984
amendment to the ADEA.199 The amendment provided that the
ADEA would now apply abroad. 00 Interestingly, the purpose of
the 1984 amendment was to correct the anomaly of having Title
VII apply abroad while the ADEA, with similar legislative goals,
was only applied domestically. It is clear from the legislative his-
tory of this amendment that Congress believed Title VII was in-
tended to apply extraterritorially.
ARAMCO may have numerous effects on other areas of law. In
the war on drugs, it had been routine to apply United States nar-
cotics laws to smuggling activities that occur on foreign soil but are
directed at the United States, even though many federal drug laws
contain no "clear statement" that Congress intended such applica-
tion. 01 Also, the well-developed principles concerning the extrater-
ritorial application of the antitrust laws could well be obsolete.
On June 11, 1991, House of Representatives Bill 1 was intro-
duced. 0 12 This bill was entitled the Civil Rights Restoration Act of
199. 29 USC § 621 et seq.
200. EEOC v Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S Ct 1227, 1234 (1991).
201. Born and Callcott, Legal Times at 26 (cited in note 183).
202. HR 1, 102nd Cong, 1st Sess (June 11, 1991).
SEC. 119. PROTECTION OF EXTRATERRITORIAL EMPLOYMENT.
(a) DEFINITION OF EMPLOYEE.-Section 701(f) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(42 U.S.C. 2000e(f)) is amended by adding at the end the following:
"With respect to employment in a foreign country, such term includes an individual
who is a citizen of the United States.".
(b) EXEMPTION.-Section 702 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-1)
is amended-
(1) by inserting "(a)" after "SEC. 702.", and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
"(b) It shall not be unlawful under section 703 or 704 for an employer (or a corpora-
tion controlled by an employer) labor organization, employment agency, or joint man-
agement committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining (includ-
ing on-the-job training programs) to take any action otherwise prohibited by such
section, with respect to an employee in a workplace in a foreign country if compliance
with such section would cause such employer (or such corporation), such organiza-
tion, such agency, or such committee to violate the law of the foreign country in
which such workplace is located.
"(c)(1) If an employer controls a corporation whose place of incorporation is a foreign
country, any practice prohibited by section 703 or 704 engaged in by such corporation
shall be presumed to be engaged in by such employer.
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1991. Section 119 of that bill provides for an amendment to the
definition of employee in 42 USC § 2000e(f). By this bill, the
House includes in the definition of employee a United States citi-
zen working in a foreign country. The House further clarified the
meaning of the alien exemption clause by stating that the section
would not apply if it were' to violate the laws of the foreign
government.
These reactions of Congress to the ARAMCO decision indicate
that it is likely to be swiftly overturned.
Carl Zacharia
"(2) Sections 703 and 704 shall not apply with respect to the foreign operations of an
employer that is a foreign person not controlled by an American employer.
"(3) For purposes of this subsection, the determination of whether an employer con-
trols a corporation shall be based on-
"(A) the interrelation of operations;
"(B) the common management;
"(C) the centralized control of labor relations; and
"(D) the common ownership or financial control; of the employer and the
corporation."
(c) APPLICATION OF AMENDMENTS.-The amendments made by this section
shall not apply with respect to conduct occurring before the date of the enactment of
this Act.
HR 1, 102d Cong, 1st Sess (June 11, 1991).
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